

DAIMLERCHRYSLER

Extension of the Agenda*

of the 9th Annual Meeting
of DaimlerChrysler AG
on Wednesday, April 4, 2007

* Convenience translation. The German text is legally binding.

Dear shareholders,

In addition to the Agenda of the Annual Meeting of DaimlerChrysler AG to be held on April 4, 2007, which was published in the electronic version of the German Federal Gazette on February 27, 2007, the shareholders Prof. Dr. Ekkehard Wenger and Dr. Leonhard Knoll have requested the publication of the following items to be decided upon by that Annual Meeting pursuant to Section 122, Subsection 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG):

9. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Change of Name

The following resolutions are submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption by separate votes:

- a) Article 1 of the Articles of Incorporation, currently worded
“The name of the corporation is DaimlerChrysler AG. The registered office of the corporation is in Stuttgart.”

is amended as follows:

“The name of the corporation is Daimler-Benz AG. The registered office of the corporation is in Stuttgart.”

- b) The Board of Management is authorized to defer notification of the change of name for entry in the Commercial Register until the Chrysler Group is separated from the Group or sold, but not later than March 31, 2008.

Reason: Maintaining a corporate name that evokes associations with the failure of the business combination with Chrysler is detrimental to the image of the corporation and its products. This is all the more true as unflattering nicknames such as Doting Daimler, Daimler-Crisis or even Crime-ler have long been in circulation. The disadvantages this entails for shareholders, customers and employees can only be borne at most for a short transition period until there is a proper separation from Chrysler. If a proper separation cannot be effected within one year, this would only serve to underscore the need to remove this affliction on the image from the corporation’s name.

10. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Determining the Venue of the Annual Meeting

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

Article 14 of the Articles of Incorporation is amended to include the following Sentence 4:

“The Annual Meeting shall be held in Stuttgart if the two preceding Annual Meetings were not held in Stuttgart.”

Reason: The executive bodies of the corporation may no longer be permitted to avoid a dispute with shareholders from the area in which the corporation is domiciled and who are particularly interested in the success of the corporation for more than two years in succession.

Transitional arrangement:

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

Notwithstanding the amendment to the Articles of Incorporation under Agenda Item 10, the Annual Meeting in the year 2008 does not have to be held in Stuttgart.

Reason: A costly change of arrangements that have already been made for the year 2008 is to be avoided.

11. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Election of the Chairman of the Annual Meeting

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

Article 18 of the Articles of Incorporation is amended to include the following paragraph 4:

“At the request of shareholders who together hold a share of the capital stock amounting to at least €500,000, the person chairing the Annual Meeting pursuant to Article 18, Paragraph 1 of the Articles of Incorporation can be removed and replaced by another person, who does not have to be a member of the Supervisory Board. The replacement can be limited to the discussion of and voting on individual items of the agenda.”

Reason: The mandatory stipulations of the Articles of Incorporation on the person chairing the Annual Meeting are inexpedient. This is particularly true when the person chairing the Annual Meeting does not perform this duty properly. An impressive example of this can be found in the report by the newspaper “Die Welt” on the conduct of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board Hilmar Kopper at the Extraordinary Annual Meeting of Daimler-Benz AG at which the business combination with Chrysler was rushed through without giving consideration to important counter-arguments. The newspaper report states that shareholders who “railed against a ‘risky’ corporation were instructed by Kopper to please stick to the point.”

12. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Age Limit for Members of the Supervisory Board Representing the Shareholders

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

Article 8 of the Articles of Incorporation is amended to include the following Paragraph 4:

“No person who is 60 years old or older on the day of the election shall be elected as a member of the Supervisory Board representing the shareholders. If the average age of the members of the Supervisory Board representing the shareholders including the candidates standing for election is under 58 on the day of the election, no person who is 67 or older shall be elected.”

Reason: An over-aged Supervisory Board damages the corporation as commitment, attention and the willingness for reorientation decrease with advancing age. The best example is the corporation itself. The clearly over-aged Supervisory Board left the last two Chairmen of the Board of Management in place for far too long instead of replacing them in time.

13. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Limit on the Number of Mandates of Members of the Supervisory Board Representing the Shareholders

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

Article 8 of the Articles of Incorporation is amended to include the following Paragraph 5:

“No person who is a member of the board of management of a DAX 30 corporation or who holds more than two supervisory board positions at DAX 30 corporations shall be elected as a member of the Supervisory Board representing the shareholders. Chairmanship of the supervisory board of a DAX 30 corporation counts double towards the total number of board positions held.”

Reason: Control of the Board of Management of the corporation requires a commitment that is not possible if the burden of work becomes excessive due to other board positions. There is also the risk that a close group of people who do not wish to damage their personal networks form non-aggression pacts. This is the only way to explain the fact that no respected member of the German business community could be found who was willing to put the obvious management deficiencies at the top levels of the corporation in order before those responsible lost their own will to continue. In 2006, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bank, who has been proposed for election to the Supervisory Board by the Supervisory Board, publicly protested that the exponents of long-term mismanagement were referred to as “failures”. This culture of glossing over poor performance has proved to be extraordinarily damaging to the corporation and its shareholders.

14. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Shareholders’ Right of Comment

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

The Articles of Incorporation are amended to include the following Article 18a:

“Article 18a Shareholders’ Right of Comment

If, at an Annual Meeting, tribute is paid to the actual or supposed merits of a member of the Board of Management or the Supervisory Board on the occasion of his or her retirement or on any other occasion, the shareholders shall then be given an opportunity to respond. If this tribute is paid on an Internet site set up by the corporation, it must also link properly to an Internet discussion forum.”

Reason: The culture of glossing over mismanagement that prevails at the top levels of German corporations is a key reason for the fact that this mismanagement is not stopped in a timely manner. This culture must be broken. One aspect of this culture is the mutual congratulation among colleagues at the end of the Annual Meeting, to which shareholders can no longer respond. Being forced to face criticism would be extremely helpful not just for the German economy but also for the self-discovery of the parties concerned, who are often severely out of touch with reality. Moreover, it has a devastating effect on the corporation’s image when shareholders who have suffered for years are provoked as follows, even on February 28, 2007, on the corporation’s web site without being given a properly linked opportunity to respond: “With his farsighted strategy, Jürgen Schrempp has made DaimlerChrysler into an automobile corporation unique in the world. I would like to thank him for this personally as well as on behalf of the entire Board of Management and the workforce,” stated future Board of Management Chairman Dr. Dieter Zetsche, underscoring the achievements of his predecessor. “Jürgen Schrempp demonstrated exceptional business leadership in his ten years at the head of Germany’s biggest corporation. The entire Supervisory Board thanks him for this,” emphasized Supervisory Board Chairman of DaimlerChrysler AG Hilmar Kopper. “He is an outstanding example of the ability to implement changes, dedication to duty and responsibility to customers, employees and shareholders.” To top it all, the “business combination of Daimler-Benz and the Chrysler Corporation” is praised as one of the “milestones in Schrempp’s career”. The results of Jürgen Schrempp’s work then receive this final comment: “Today, DaimlerChrysler is uniquely positioned with ... a balanced range of products and brands.”

15. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Separate Counting of Votes from Various Shareholder Groups

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

Article 19 of the Articles of Incorporation is amended to include the following paragraph 3:

“At the request of shareholders who together hold a share of the capital stock amounting to at least €500,000, voting on the individual items of the agenda is to take place in the form that at first only private individuals vote who are not represented by voting proxies as allowed by Section 125, Subsection 1, Sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). After the results of their voting have been announced, the shareholder associations cast the votes allocated to them as allowed by Section 125, Subsection 1, Sentence 1 of the AktG, whereby they do not have to cast votes for which they have received voting instructions (“separated votes”). After the results of this voting have been announced, all the other votes are cast and counted, including the separated votes. After that, the overall result is announced. The motion proposing the separate counting of votes is to be received by the corporation at the latest seven days after the publication of the respective items of the agenda in the electronic version of the German Federal Gazette with evidence of the required share ownership.”

Reason: Institutional investors and custodial banks with proxy voting rights are often subject to massive conflicts of interest when voting, due to the fact that they have other business relations with the corporation which are more important to them than a proper voting procedure. It is otherwise inexplicable why institutional investors and custodial banks have repeatedly ratified the actions of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board despite their mismanagement and the resulting miserable development of the Daimler share price, and have even reelected the responsible Supervisory Board members. In order to shed more light on these conflicts of interest, upon a motion being proposed by a qualified minority, at first those votes are to be counted that are affected by no, or only minor, conflicts of interest. In this way, the institutional investors and the custodial banks will at least be subject to more pressure to justify their sometimes scandalous voting behavior. Whoever votes against the majority of the private individuals and against the majority of the shareholders’ associations should also have to expect that his or her behavior will be taken into account with respect to the liability law, supervisory law and criminal law, if he or she cannot offer any convincing reasons.

16. Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation – Preparation of Verbatim Minutes of the Annual Meeting

The following resolution is submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption:

The Articles of Incorporation are amended to include the following Article 18b:

“Article 18b Production of Verbatim Minutes of the Annual Meeting

Verbatim minutes of the proceedings of the Annual Meeting shall be prepared. To ensure its accuracy, an audio or video recording shall be made which may only be interrupted if shareholders demand such interruption while they speak at the Annual Meeting. The shareholders shall be notified of this right. At least two technically independent systems shall be used for the recording so that the proceedings of the debate can still be documented if one system fails. All recordings must be stored for at least five years.”

Reason: The shareholders must be given the opportunity to provide exact proof of their own statements and those made by the management in the event of civil law proceedings or criminal law investigations. This opportunity used to exist when the management had verbatim minutes produced without being obliged to do so. This sensible custom was discontinued for unknown reasons. It is possible that the management does not wish to be held to any comments it makes in the Annual Meeting. If it wishes to refute this presumption it should resume its former standard practice.

17. Transformation into a European Stock Corporation (SE)

The following resolutions are submitted to the Annual Meeting for adoption by separate votes:

- a) The Board of Management is instructed to take the necessary measures so that a resolution on the transformation of the corporation into a European Stock Corporation (SE) can be voted on no later than the next ordinary Annual Meeting.
- b) The Board of Management is instructed to conduct the necessary negotiations with the employee representatives with the objective that the Supervisory Board should only have twelve members and that the negative impact of equal numbers of members representing the shareholders and the employees on the propensity to invest of current and future investors should be taken into account in the composition of the Supervisory Board.

Reason: Unlike German stock corporation law, European stock corporation law allows for a reduction in the number of members of the Supervisory Board. The need to reduce the size of hypertrophic supervisory boards as prescribed by the German Stock Corporation Act can only be doubted by persons unaware of the facts. Aside from this, it is not clear what the shareholders may expect in return for remunerating the currently ten employee representatives on the Supervisory Board when they pass on most or all of this compensation to a trade union-related foundation. Such circumstances are rightly greeted by investors, upon whose cooperation the employees depend for the financing of future investments, with suspicion. This is why corporations subject to the German Industrial Codetermination Act are not valued as highly and face disadvantages when raising capital. This applies even more in the specific case of Daimler as former Chairman of the Board of Management Jürgen Schrempp practiced a disastrous symbiosis with Supervisory Board members representing the employees who delayed his removal and the realignment of business policy for years. Both the shareholders and especially the employees suffered as a result.

18. Motion for a Resolution on the Execution of a Special Audit pursuant to Section 142, Subsection 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to examine the issue of whether the members of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board were in breach of duty in neglecting to examine all options to make claims for damages against the responsible members of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board and the relevant consultants and auditors or to at least effect an adequate reduction in current compensation or pension benefits or to cancel share-based components of compensation following the statements made by the Stuttgart District Court on August 4, 2006 concerning the business combination between Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler Corporation that

“the conversion ratio quickly negotiated on April 9, 1998 was in no way legally preceded by any due-diligence examination of the respective other corporation – neither commercially nor technically – and presumably only the market values of the two corporations were compared, whereby the market value of Chrysler Corporation was increased by a premium of almost 30%.”

“Such a method in no way represents a responsible or comprehensible balancing of interests between the groups of shareholders involved, and in fact appears to have been arbitrary.”

“Thus, the approval by a large majority of votes was not based on substantiated information.”

The lawyer Nicola Monissen, Klosterstrasse 4, 89143 Blaubeuren, shall be appointed as the special auditor under the proviso that she may enlist auxiliary staff of her choosing as required to conduct the audit.

Reason: Following the comments by the District Court, which arrived at the conclusion that there had been a serious misevaluation by the partners in the business combination, there should be an investigation to determine whether those responsible can be called to account. There is no indication that either the Board of Management or the Supervisory Board have taken any action of this kind.

19. **Motion for a Resolution on the Execution of a Special Audit pursuant to Section 142, Subsection 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to examine the issue of whether the Supervisory Board neglected its obligations of due care and attention when, in spring 2003, close to when the share price reached its lowest point for several years, it issued 20.5 million options to the Board of Management and other management staff of the corporation at an exercise price of only €34.40 per share.**

The lawyer Nicola Monissen, Klosterstrasse 4, 89143 Blaubeuren, shall be appointed as the special auditor under the proviso that she may enlist auxiliary staff of her choosing as required to conduct the audit.

Reason: It is not clear how a Supervisory Board that is complying with its obligations of due care and attention could have the idea to issue options precisely at the moment when share prices are practically in free fall due to temporary market disruptions with correspondingly low strike prices, instead of waiting until the situation on the stock market had settled down again. The management has since been able to redeem the options issued in 2003 at considerable profit without the shareholders seeing anything in return as, following a strong recovery from its lowest point in several years, the share price is still lower than it was in April 2000 when the Annual Meeting approved the option program. It must be explained what considerations moved the Supervisory Board to make it so easy for the managers to get rich at the expense of the shareholders.

20. Motion for a Resolution on the Execution of a Special Audit pursuant to Section 142, Subsection 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to examine the issue of whether the corporation is owed damages in relation to an interview by the former Chairman of the Board of Management Jürgen Schrempp in the Financial Times, which later aided a class action lawsuit in the United States that was settled at USD 300 million, of which the corporation was required to pay an uninsured share which was an eight-digit amount.

It is necessary to examine:

- whether liability claims can be enforced against the former Chairman of the Board of Management or at least could have been enforced if asserted in a timely manner,
- whether and in what form and for what reasons the Supervisory Board took action or failed to take action against the former Chairman of the Board of Management in this matter,
- whether claims for damages can be asserted against the members of the Supervisory Board who were responsible at the relevant times arising from insufficient or untimely pursuit of claims on the part of the corporation against the former Chairman of the Board of Management Jürgen Schrempp.

The lawyer Nicola Monissen, Klosterstrasse 4, 89143 Blaubeuren, shall be appointed as the special auditor under the proviso that she may enlist auxiliary staff of her choosing as required to conduct the audit.

Reason: The newspaper Stuttgarter Zeitung reported on January 3, 2007 under the headline “Millions for one careless interview” that the insurance companies from which DaimlerChrysler bought its liability insurance for members of the Board of Management are only covering “most of the necessary €175 million”, which was claimed from the insurance companies in connection with the class action lawsuit in which the corporation settled. Even if the insurance claim had been fully covered, €175 million would in no way have been enough to cover the settlement amount, with the result that the corporation would have lost an eight-digit amount just on account of the settlement amount. It is not evident that this loss would still have been incurred if the former Chairman of the Board of Management had not given his “careless interview”. Also, the corporation presumably incurred other losses amounting to at least an eight-digit figure as it had to pay lawyers’ fees, particularly for those lawyers involved in lawsuits relating to the interview in which the corporation did not settle.

21. Motion for a Resolution on the Execution of a Special Audit pursuant to Section 142, Subsection 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to examine the issue of the extent to which current or former members of the Board of Management or the Supervisory Board were aware of transactions that have since led to investigations by various authorities, including the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US Department of Justice in particular, or whether the above persons can be accused of organizational failure as no sufficient precautions were taken to prevent these transactions.

It is necessary to examine whether these persons were aware or negligently unaware of or negligently failed to take precautions to prevent certain transactions with regard to all matters listed in the 2005 Annual Report under Note 31 (“Legal Proceedings”) from the second half of page 185 (English version). These are:

- “improper payments”, that “raise concerns under the US-Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), German law, and the laws of other jurisdictions”;
- “certain payable accounts related to consolidated subsidiaries” that “were not eliminated during consolidation”;
- “potential tax liabilities” that were the subject of internal investigations;
- a “portion of the taxes related to compensation paid to expatriate employees” that “was not properly reported”;
- a “formal order of investigation” by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in connection with the United Nations’ Oil-for-Food program.

The special audit should also include all the transactions not listed in the Annual Report that are pertinently related to the above investigations by the SEC and the US Department of Justice or that were the subject of the questioning of the former Board of Management member Manfred Gentz by the US authorities or their representatives, that were mentioned on page 122 of issue 37/2006 of “Der Spiegel” magazine, and which are supposedly the reason for the fact that the Supervisory Board meeting took place in Canada instead of the United States. In this context, it should also be clarified whether it is actually true that members of the Board of Management or the Supervisory Board wished to avoid coming into contact with US territory and, if so, who this was.

The lawyer Nicola Monissen, Klosterstrasse 4, 89143 Blaubeuren, shall be appointed as the special auditor under the proviso that she may enlist auxiliary staff of her choosing as required to conduct the audit.

Reason: The investigations of the US authorities have been going through the press for some time without the corporation having commented on this in any comprehensible way for the shareholders. At best, the information in the 2005 Annual Report hints at how significant these clearly extremely unpleasant transactions are and who is responsible for them; the information in the 2006 Annual Report is even sparser. Clarification is needed all the more urgently as the above article in Der Spiegel gives the impression that current or former members of the Board of Management or the Supervisory Board at least temporarily wished to avoid coming into contact with US territory. This is aggravated by the fact that the online edition of Manager-Magazin raised speculation that the US authorities felt the transactions were so important that they were demanding that a person accept responsibility at Board of Management level. The newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on September 14, 2006 with reference to the newspaper Handelsblatt, that it was supposed that the former Board of Management member responsible for Finance, Manfred Gentz, “was in trouble”. This question should also be examined.

22. Motion for a Resolution on the Execution of a Special Audit pursuant to Section 142, Subsection 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to examine the issue of whether, prior to the Federal Court of Justice repealing the prison sentence handed down by the Stuttgart District Court on the businessman Gerhard Schweinle, the current Chairman of the Board of Management Dr. Zetsche and various employees of the corporation provided false, incomplete, misleading or otherwise inaccurate information on an alleged fraud committed against the corporation in the area of so-called gray-market transactions, if so, what internal preliminary clarification this information was based on, who knew of this and who knew of any grey-market transactions per se and who profited from any grey-market transactions.

The lawyer Nicola Monissen, Klosterstrasse 4, 89143 Blaubeuren, shall be appointed as the special auditor under the proviso that she may enlist auxiliary staff of her choosing as required to conduct the audit.

Reason: Employees of the corporation and the current Chairman of the Board of Management Dr. Zetsche gave testimony before the Stuttgart District Court in the trial of Gerhard Schweinle. Among other things, the subject of the trial was an alleged defraud of DaimlerChrysler AG by Gerhard Schweinle. The Stuttgart District Court handed down a prison sentence on Gerhard Schweinle, which he commenced. Among other things, the sentence was based on alleged defraud on account of alleged non-compliant reselling of DaimlerChrysler vehicles. The destination of these vehicles should then have caused an error at the corporation, purely as a matter of course. An opinion of the performance of Stuttgart’s law courts can be derived from a resolution by the Federal Court of Justice on June 9, 2004, which, so to speak, tore the fraud conviction to shreds. Stating the reasons for its decision, the Federal Court of Justice stated that there are

“material doubts as to the evidence of fraudulent acts ... with regard to the knowledge on the part of the representatives of DaimlerChrysler AG of the defendant’s intentions to resell.” The Federal Court of Justice felt there were certain considerations explained in more detail indicating knowledge on the part of the representatives of DaimlerChrysler AG. The Federal Court of Justice also commented: The District Court “should have considered ... that, from 2000, there was an accumulation of cases in which so-called cross-border commissions were claimed outside the intended sales channels, particularly from Far Eastern countries for exports intended for those regions (by the end of 2000: 14; by the end of 2001: a further 47); nonetheless, vehicles were delivered to the defendant until the end of October 2001, even though the phenomenon of such parallel exports was already known to DaimlerChrysler AG. If, taking these circumstances into consideration, a new trial court judge was unable to rule out at least a tacit agreement between the defendant and the representatives of DaimlerChrysler negotiating with him, there would not only have been no financial loss but also no error would have been caused as defined by Section 263 of the German Criminal Code.” Under these circumstances, there is a need for clarification regarding whether and to what extent there was knowledge of the grey-market transactions within the corporation – particularly at Board of Management level – and, if so, whether attempts were made to cover up this knowledge both in general and in respect of the District Court. There should also be investigations as to who profited from the so-called grey-market transactions.

23. Motion for a Resolution on the Execution of a Special Audit pursuant to Section 142, Subsection 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to examine the issue of whether the Supervisory Board sufficiently monitored the administration of the former Chairman of the Board of Management Jürgen Schrempp, whether it – particularly in view of his services – granted him inappropriately high compensation, whether the Supervisory Board checked that all benefits to the former Chairman of the Board of Management were recorded as Board of Management compensation, and whether in the case of the employment of family members and relatives of the former Chairman of the Board of Management the Supervisory Board demanded and monitored the rendering of appropriate services, or arranged for this to be done, and, if so, who is/was responsible for doing this.

It is necessary to examine:

- whether the compensation or pension benefits are or were appropriate in view of the services rendered,

- whether the former Chairman of the Board of Management was sufficiently present at the domicile of the corporation or whether his work on the Board of Management suffered on account of his choice of residence, and particularly whether other members of the Board of Management or other employees had to travel because of this,
- whether the employment relationship with the wife of the former Chairman of the Board of Management despite the place of residence allows or allowed undisturbed rendering of services,
- whether the corporation incurred other costs as a result of the change of residence, for example, as a result of providing an infrastructure or construction work and whether these costs were reported under Board of Management compensation,
- by what criteria the service of his wife, brother and any other relatives or family members of the former Chairman of the Board of Management who may work or have worked for the corporation were assessed and remunerated and who was responsible for the assessment,
- whether internal principles that regulate or regulated the employment of family members and relatives of Board of Management members were revoked or modified in respect of the Schrempp family and what role was played in this by the Supervisory Board.

The lawyer Nicola Monissen, Klosterstrasse 4, 89143 Blaubeuren, shall be appointed as the special auditor under the proviso that she may enlist auxiliary staff of her choosing as required to conduct the audit.

Reason: According to the 2006 Annual Report, total compensation of the Board of Management decreased from €34.9 million in the previous year to €20.5 million. On the other hand, the compensation of former Board of Management members and their dependents rose from €16.9 million to €25.1 million. It must be supposed that these drastic changes are related to the compensation of the former Chairman of the Board of Management, which has been kept secret to date, and who has been receiving retirement compensation since 2006. This alone gives good grounds to doubt the appropriateness of his compensation – even compared to the other very generously paid members of the Board of Management – especially when one considers how the shareholders have suffered under his decisions. At the 2005 Annual Meeting, questions regarding the presence of the Chairman of the Board of Management at the corporation’s headquarters in light of his having relocated his residence to Munich were answered only evasively or not at all. The same applies to questions as to whether the corporation incurred any expenses as a result of the change of residence and to questions concerning the employment of his wife. In light of this, it should be examined what circumstances were under the control of Jürgen Schrempp in the final phase of his activities on the Board of Management.

**Statement by the Management of DaimlerChrysler AG
on the Motions Proposed by Shareholders Prof. Dr. Ekkehard Wenger and Dr. Leonhard Knoll**

The Board of Management and the Supervisory Board recommend to vote against the motions on Items 9a to 17b of the Agenda.

The requested amendments to the Articles of Incorporation are neither necessary nor appropriate. The DaimlerChrysler name is established all over the world. There are no grounds to change the name of the corporation. Moreover, the Articles of Incorporation already contain balanced and sufficient provisions for the venue and procedure of the Annual Meeting, the person chairing the meeting and the suitability and qualifications of Supervisory Board members, which do not require any further regulation.

The management has assessed the suitability of the corporation's current legal form and has considered its advantages and disadvantages compared to other corporate forms. The management did not ascertain any need for change.

The Supervisory Board recommends to vote against the motions on Items 18 to 23 of the Agenda.

There are no grounds for the special audits requested. Some of the motions relate to ongoing proceedings and official investigations that are not expected to produce any findings beyond the findings already established through those current proceedings. To the extent that proceedings are addressed that are the subject of public prosecution investigations, which the authorities already discontinued before, as they had no sufficient basis, a special audit cannot be expected to provide any additional benefit.

The Supervisory Board exercises its duties of care and acts in the interests of the corporation. The amount of compensation and the system of compensation for Board of Management members is always determined by the Supervisory Board with the aid of external consultants after careful examination and in consideration of competitiveness and appropriateness. The compensation is explained in detail in the Annual Report so that anyone can make an assessment of it and there are no grounds for a separate audit of compensation matters.

Stuttgart, March 9, 2007

DaimlerChrysler AG
The Board of Management

DaimlerChrysler
Stuttgart, Germany
Auburn Hills, USA
www.daimlerchrysler.com